Abstract
Storrs McCall proposes a model of the universe in which the future is understood to branch into many worlds. The future is thus radically different than the past. This model provides a most useable platform for addressing a diversity of theoretical and practical problems in relation to architectural ethics. The paper discusses one dimension of this: the design ethics of Daniel Libeskind’s scheme for the reconstruction of New York Ground Zero. In post-Enlightenment ethics, Hume’s law asserts that there is no deductive relation between whatever “is” in the real world and whatever other things and conditions “ought” to be in it. There are no ethical facts, only moral acts. This leaves no grounds for architecture to be reckoned either as ethical or unethical in its own terms. But if we accept that the future branches into many worlds, then it can be argued that every architectural proposition of reasonable complexity (or every copulation of propositions as Hume puts it) also branches in the present in an explosion of alternative interpretations. A design can be judged to be ethical in terms of how it addresses this alterity of future worlds. Our agenda should be to critique the probable futures in a design proposal, and to promote those other futures that are perceived as desirable but are as yet only barely possible.
Citation
Linzey, M. (2004) Many Worlds Ethics., in Redmond, J., Durling, D. and de Bono, A (eds.), Futureground - DRS International Conference 2004, 17-21 November, Melbourne, Australia. https://dl.designresearchsociety.org/drs-conference-papers/drs2004/researchpapers/68
Many Worlds Ethics.
Storrs McCall proposes a model of the universe in which the future is understood to branch into many worlds. The future is thus radically different than the past. This model provides a most useable platform for addressing a diversity of theoretical and practical problems in relation to architectural ethics. The paper discusses one dimension of this: the design ethics of Daniel Libeskind’s scheme for the reconstruction of New York Ground Zero. In post-Enlightenment ethics, Hume’s law asserts that there is no deductive relation between whatever “is” in the real world and whatever other things and conditions “ought” to be in it. There are no ethical facts, only moral acts. This leaves no grounds for architecture to be reckoned either as ethical or unethical in its own terms. But if we accept that the future branches into many worlds, then it can be argued that every architectural proposition of reasonable complexity (or every copulation of propositions as Hume puts it) also branches in the present in an explosion of alternative interpretations. A design can be judged to be ethical in terms of how it addresses this alterity of future worlds. Our agenda should be to critique the probable futures in a design proposal, and to promote those other futures that are perceived as desirable but are as yet only barely possible.