Abstract
In current interaction design research there is a widespread belief that situated action and embodied interaction should replace mental representations in the theoretical account of human cognition. This exclusion of representation is however diagnosed as a sign of representation-phobia by Anderson (2003) who claims that it is misguided. This paper aims to show why and how it can be overcome. Initially, a literature review will show how representation-phobia manifests itself through two different versions in HCI research. On the basis of this I argue that representation-phobia leads to a theoretical dead end. Then, by drawing on semiotics and recent findings from cognitive research, I argue that we cannot understand the rich complexity of embodied interaction unless we furnish our thinking with a dynamic notion of representation.
Keywords
Cognition, Embodied Interaction, Representation, Experiential Knowledge, Semiotics
Citation
Markussen, T. (2010) Representation-phobia and the Complexity of Embodied Interaction, in Durling, D., Bousbaci, R., Chen, L, Gauthier, P., Poldma, T., Roworth-Stokes, S. and Stolterman, E (eds.), Design and Complexity - DRS International Conference 2010, 7-9 July, Montreal, Canada. https://dl.designresearchsociety.org/drs-conference-papers/drs2010/researchpapers/81
Representation-phobia and the Complexity of Embodied Interaction
In current interaction design research there is a widespread belief that situated action and embodied interaction should replace mental representations in the theoretical account of human cognition. This exclusion of representation is however diagnosed as a sign of representation-phobia by Anderson (2003) who claims that it is misguided. This paper aims to show why and how it can be overcome. Initially, a literature review will show how representation-phobia manifests itself through two different versions in HCI research. On the basis of this I argue that representation-phobia leads to a theoretical dead end. Then, by drawing on semiotics and recent findings from cognitive research, I argue that we cannot understand the rich complexity of embodied interaction unless we furnish our thinking with a dynamic notion of representation.